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PRE-

coNFERENCE ON THE MAOIST REBELLION IN NEPAL
Welcome back to our evening discussion. This
evening we will begin with reaction statements from
two of our members, Mary Des Chene and Stephen
Mikesell, and then we will open our discussion to all
of you. Mary Des Chene will you begin?
Mary Des Chene: I want to do three things this
evening. First, some audience members asked me
to discuss a several issues that were neglected during the paper sessions. Second, I want to respond to
some things I heard in the afternoon sessions. Lastly,
I want to suggest some issues that we all need to be
thinking about.
One issue mentioned to me after the formal discussion in the afternoon is the land issue. We have
managed to talk for a whole day without considering
land ownership, which is a fundamental issue for
very many supporters of the Maoists. We should all
be struck with this. It shows that we've had a very
urban and middle class perspective. That issue made
me think more generally that the Maoist Three Point
Plan has not come into this discussion at all yet.
And I just want to point out here that most of the
things that are on that list are either enshrined in the
constitution or are in already existing laws: the state
should be doing most of these things now, by its
own laws. So ignoring those very specific demands
as the ravings of radicals, is really inadequate. And,
proclaiming that these demands are cynical ploys to
capture state power also seems disingenuous, a way
to discredit the claim. It is something that can only
get tested through a negotiation process.
Mark Liechty, who had to leave, said he was surprised that the term "nation" never really emerged
in the discussion this afternoon. I am not going to
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repeat all he said here, but his comment reminded
me that there are other important grassroots movements going on in the countryside: the ethnic movements, the language-based movements, and so on.
So, Mark's comment about "nation" identifies one of
the sources of the Maoist rebellion that we have not
explored adequately.
From today's session, we had a very vivid portrait
from Judith Pettigrew of the army on a rampage in
a village. And in another case, Kanak Dixit brought
out cases of Maoists executing people that would not
appear to be class enemies. I think that it's probably not useful to argue over who was engaging in
worse human rights violations. There is a fair bit of
documentary evidence to be looked at. But rather
let's look at the people judith talked about, those
who are not political activists, but are "caught in the
middle." This is something that is really widespread,
especially outside of the Maoist "base areas ." Some of
the points that Richard Bownas was making about
differences between organizing in places with embedded organizers who have long been part of the
society and in places where there is the recent expansion of struggle. But I think that when we talk
about being "caught in the middle," we must note
that in the vast majority of documented cases, the
Maoists are seeking food and shelter, while the army
actions in the village are in the form of beatings and
killings. These are not equivalent things, and I think
that needs to be emphasized when we think about
what people are caught in the middle of. There have
been many cases like those judith described that
have been documented by Amnesty International
and other human rights organizations. In addition,
there are many other cases that aren't well enough

documented to get into th e human rights reports. That raises
the question whether the sLate actions in the current crisis
represent dev iations from iLs main tendency or reveal its
main Lendency. This return s us to the question of what those
holding po·wer now mea n by democracy, or mean by human
rights, or mean by people. Those are hard questions that anybody who wants to talk about the nature of the war needs to
be thinking about.
I want to comment on t\.vo statements that Kanak Dixit
made this afternoon. Is Kanak here? (Voice yells "Not yet, but
he will come soon ")
Well, but I don't have time to wait because Arjun tells me
my time is up ... In his talk today Kanak said he vvasn't going
to talk about army killings. I want to say no to the idea that
thi s is a subj ect that should be tabled . Anybody who believes
in the right of state government to exist in Nepal has the duty
to document to the best of their ability the conditions under
which the killings are occurring. I especially include in this
group social scientists who have made their careers in Nepal.
Kanak also said "most problems are linked to the intelligentsia within the Kathmandu valley." I think he meant that
the failures of the intelligentsia are the main problem. I find
this a very narrow reading of Nepal's reality. What is missing
is the entrenched landlords in the countryside, the intense
culture of oppression, the struggles of peasants, and many
many other issues. The question is who will determine Nepal 's future: the elites or the masses. I personally can't imagine how Kathmandu intellectuals are capable of resolving
most of these problems, though they could contribute more
to them. Rather it will require very deep knowledge of local
and regional issues and of local ways of battling through.
One last thing we must think about: the role of internation al agenls. What about the $20 million in military aiel and
Lhe 5,500 machine guns the US recently provided? What is
the very real but complex role this aid plays in expanding and
deepening the war in Nepal. We need think seriously about
this issue. I'll stop now.
Arjun Guneratne: Thank you Mary. Now let's hear from
our second commentator, Stephen Mikesell.
THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT

Stephen Mikesell: I want to take off on thi s last point that
Mary was making. It is striking that all these discussions and
papers were made without including the international context, and yet we're seeing very similar things happening all
over the world . If you read, for example , Monthly Review,
you see analyses of a lot of similar things, and even worse
things, happening in Central America lately. Indeed , condition s in Central America are much more advariced than Nepal
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and may suggest what's going to happen in Nepal over the
next few yea rs. It's curious that with everyone talking about
globalization, we don't look at Nepal from a global perspective . We're now in a world that's dominated by international
fin ance, which has been setting the agenda in Nepal over the
last ten years, with the privatizations and the other "solutions"
they've been promoting. So, reformers acting with the of best
intentions, trying to implement democracy will be up against
the very real problems international finance will impose. For
example, in the last ten years since democracy came, I know
that something like twenty international banks have opened
branches in Nepal. As Lenin pointed out a century ago in
his book Imperialism , the Last Stage of Capitalism, banks are
the vehicles by which financial capital establishes rule over
a country. In Nepal you can see it concentrating many small
pools of capital, which once were available in the countryside, but have now been taken out and are no longer available.
Even if they were used for usury, they were still locally available and that's the way agriculture has been maintained over
the centuries. But, now they're being concentrated outside of
the villages and are being absorbed by large capital in order
to advance their agendas in the country. Take automobiles,
for example. I heard there are now 200,000 automobiles that
have been imported into Kathmandu, for 90 km of roads!
If you multiply that number times $20,000 per automobile,
I think you have $4 billion just in automobiles, including,
among other things-and adding the petroleum imports required by automobiles-the growing trade imbalance.
Another issue is cultural change. Hundreds of thousands
of people are becoming Christians each year, especially
among the lower classes. This is the same constituency that
the Maoists are aiming at. Many of these revivalist Protestant
Christian projects are out of Korea. This kind of Christianity is promoting an American agenda, or a multinational and
capitalist agenda, among other things. And, if we are talking
of losing culture, as pointed out in the book Fishers for Men,
Founders of Empire: The Wycliff Bible Translaters in Latin
America , Christianity is in some ways more insidious than
the Maoists. And, of course, there is TV and consumer culture that Kanak mentioned . Regarding this issue of cultural
homogenization: the question is: Culture for whom?
Another aspect of culture change comes from Nepalese sojourning in India and beyond. Some 7,000 women or so are
being trafficked to India for prostitution every year, and there
may be 100,000 or so in Bombay. Poverty forces millions of
men and women to go abroad for work, but few of us have
considered the impact of these experiences on the culture of
these people.
Then there is the question of development. In colonial
times they called it "civilizing." But after the WWll the whole
ideology of development was created in order to counter the
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rise of the nationalist movements. l think a lot of people were
making that point today. Dollars and Sense magazine recently noted that for every dollar of development aid more than
three hundred dollars are returned to the fin ance capitals of
the world. You can actually see this process in Nepal: after
how many years of development the country is burdened by
this immense international debt , among other things.
Another issue l had is education, especially in the countryside . Rather than really addressing the needs of Nepal's
rural residents, education is actually making young people
want to leave the countryside. When you look at Nepal 's
education program, it looks like something that comes out
of the West, but the image is distorted , as if you are seeing
it in a broken mirror. If you go into the classrooms, there's
tremendous overcrowding, like the hundred kids per classroom l saw in Bandipur; and l just wondered how much
they could get out of that, sitting there every day. And at
the same time they were losing whatever acculturation or
socialization they had previously had within the village. So,
in the countryside at least, I see education as a way to disqualify young people, because they aren't really prepared to
be successful in the School Leaving Certificate exam, which
is the core of the education system, nor are they prepared
to live and work in the countryside. ls it any surprise that
young people are angry and see taking up weapons as the
only solution? Even urban kids, who "succeed" in the education system with high marks and the coveted degrees in
engineering and medicine, are trying in large numbers to
leave the country to join tran snational corporate culture
that they have been educated and socialized in because they
no longer have the qualifications or tools or imagination to
find a place for themselves in th eir own country any longe r-particularly working in and among and for the vast
majority of the country, the rural population-despite their
country's crying needs.
The last issue I'd like to raise is "democracy." This returns
me to my first point: we often neglect the international contex t. ln the last ten years we've seen "democracy" come to
many, many countries. Some critics claim that this is really a much cheaper way to extend finance capital and run
the world than relying on absolute regimes with their kings
. and dictators . Also it's been a very good way of promoting
things like privatization, which never could have happened
in Nepal's old Panchayat regime, for exa mple, because that
regime had no legitimacy. Democracy legitimizes the current regimes in Nepal and elsewhere. A democratic political
system is also a way to co-opt the opposition parties. All this
co-opting and corruption that has been happening in Nepal
these last 12 years is also happening in the democratic regimes that have come to Brazil, Argentina, El Salvador and
other places. Most of these countries have had dictators and
revolutionary movements. With democracy and coalition
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governmen ts, the formerly revolu tionary oppositi on has
been coopted and NGO'd and all kinds of things. l can't
help wondeting if there is a liberal solution for these kinds
of problems7 Anyway, those are the issues that 1 wanted to
raise.
Arjun Guneratne: Thank you Steven. l believe that Mary
Des Chene will read a statement from Padma Ratna Tuladhar.
STATEMENT BY PADMA RATNA TULADHAR

Mary Des Chene: The statement I am about to read is addressed to our conference from Padma Ratna Tulaclhar. He
wrote it in English, so thi s is no translation. He sent this on 6
October 2002 so that is just two clays after the royal takeover,
when the king dismissed the government and began ruling
himself through his appointed Prime Minister:

Dear friends, as you gather to discuss the difficult tim es Ill)'
country is passing through, I lwpe it might be useful to you,
to hear from someone who's been in the midst of efforts for a
peaceful resolution. As ma11y of you may lmow, I have served as
a mediator to bring about peace tall?s between tl1 e government
and the CPN Maoists since the very beginning of the people's
war. I speal? from the perspective of wlwt that experience has
taught me. I would lihe to briefly comment on three areas: 1)
what i.s the nature of CPN-Maoi.sts and what do they want?
2) what has been the impact of negotiations and what are th e
prospects for peace? 3) what are the positive and negative im pacts of international actors?
First the Maoists. It seems many times in both internatio11al
and Nepa lese jon1111s tlwt the arm ed struggle is discussed
without reference to the Maoist ideology or political agenda.
Since the international "war 011 terrorism" began , they have
also been labeled terrorists, altlwugl1 up until that tim e th ey'd
been consistently recognizee! as a political force with a political agenda. Whether anyone agrees or disagrees with tl1 eir
agenda, an understanding of it needs to form one basis of any
discussion. I will point out a Jew hey elements of their stated
agenda.
A) The movement i.s purely a political moveme11t based on
the ideology of Marxism and Maoism .
B) The movement aims to achi eve purely political motives,
that is, the liberation of the Nepalese people from all forms of
exploitation .
C) The movement seehs to establish in Nepal a people's democracy or a hind of people's mle.
D) They do not believe that they could achieve all this i11 two
years, and with ease, so tl1 ey termed this war a lo11g- term or
protracted people's war.
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E) They believed that the present parliamentary democracy
is a capitalist democracy which cannot solve the problems of
the people of the country, so they want to end this present political system and establish a new democracy. This they declared
when they started the People's War.
F) They believe that the Nepalese people are a sovereign peopk and that they are entitled to be the masters of their motherland. And that this could happen only through the armed
revolution. That is, the use of force is esse ntial for the liberation and the empowerment of the people.

G) At the same time, they are also in Javor of dialogue or
peace negotiations to bring about the above objectives. That
is, people's war can end in dialogue and implementation of liberating policies that end exploitation of the masses. They've
always responded positively to dialogue tall~s. I've never lmown
them to reject any discussion to bring about tall?s. ·
H) At present, there's a Three Point Program: 1) the formation of an interim all-party national government; 2) the formation of a constituent assembly to be elected by the people; 3)
the institutional development of the republican state. This is
the political agenda they presented during the second round of
talks in September last year; they still stand by this agenda.
My second topic is peace negotiations.
A) First, the Maoists say that if anything could be achieved
through a peaceful means, they are quite prepared to be engaged very seriously in peace negotiations.
B) They have repeatedly said that they could be flexible in
peace negotiations and have sometimes used the phrase "maximumly flexible ." A concrete example of that flexibility is that
during last year's peace negotiations they put aside their demand for a repLtblican state and were ready to negotiate first
on the other issues alone.
C) Recently the Maoists proposed for a roundtable political
conference to convene and find a progressive way out of this
serious national problem.
D) Viable proposals have come from other political parties
and the human rights sector as well. For example, the movement to save democratic rights, of which I am a part, proposed
and offered to organize a roundtable conference to be attended
by all the major political parties, including the Maoists and the
government. It was only the government who did not indicate
willingness to participate.
E) I can inform you that the Maoists are still prepared to
respond positively once the government makes public policy
dialogue. They are also prepared even for a unilateral ceasefire on the condition that the governinent would reciprocate
immediately. The government had not made any call for dialogue, instead rejecting all overtures from both the Maoists and
united calls from the Parliamentary party. Nor has it made any
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commitment to reciprocate in a ceasefire.
F) No one can say what may happen in th e near future, or
wh ether a leg itimate government, serioLts about negotiating,
will be form ed. But it is my view that the new go vernm er1t
should have a one point program to start peace negotiations,
negotiate with sincerity and seriousness, and thus create an
environment to hold elections as soon as possible. This shOL!ld
be the prime mandate to the new go vernment.

My third area of discussion is the role of international actors . BecaLtse peace negotiations are quite possible, if there is
the political will for them, and because the Maoists have made
public commitments to peaceful solutions, and also because
they have indicated their willingness to halt the war, in my
view there is no necessity to escalate the war from eith er side.
The vast majority of the Nepalese population are always in
favor of peace tall?s. This fact or this sentiment of the people
should not be neglected by any of us. But the governme nt
stance has hardened against peaceful solutions ever since it
began receiving signals, increasingly followed up by material
assistance, of international support for defensive and offensive
military action. In this climate, more than one Nepalese official
has called for "finishing off the Maoists ." Military aid is nothing other than SLtpport for a long, bloody, civil war and for the
killing of our youth, whatever anyone may call it. We continue
to talk about talhs and remain quite hopeful of the possibility.
There are hindrances, too, some domestic, some international,
and these are exacerbated by the international climate of fear
and the easy labeling of political insurgents as terrorists.
I wish to point out two key areas where the international
sclwlars and activists might intervene on the side of increasing
the possibility of peace in Nepal. First, the government should
not purchase or import arms to esca late war. At the same
time, I am requestingforeign governments not to supply arms
to our peace-loving country. Indeed, if they were to looh into
the human rights record of the armed forces, which has been
documented by respected international bodies lil?e the U.N.,
Amnesty International, or a recent report of the European
Union, many would find themselves bound by domestic law or
treaty obligations to terminate their aid. Rather, they shou ld
help us solve our serious national problems through peacejLil means. We want to benefit from international expe rience
solving these problems through peace dialogues . We wanted to
have moral and political support from the friendly countries to
achieve peace, justice, and progress for the people of the cowr try. But while there are many friends who offer this SL!ppo rt,
there are other countries who are increasingly supplying guns,
ammunition, night vision equipme nt and strategic plans for
attacking. This military aid is really impacting tl1e COLtrse of
eve nts and derailing prospects for peace.
The second area where international scholars can help is by
pressuring their governments and other international agencies.
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,--~The Maoists are still being labeled and treated as terrorists.
Th e Nepalese government has banned them and considers the
Maoists treasonous. Their leaders have a price placed 011 their
heads and are on Interpol's lists. Although the United States
has not yet placed them on their list of terrorist organi zations,
that, too, might come. Finally, 110 government is questioning
the Nepalese government's claim that the Maoists are terrorists or tlu pachage of illegal laws tlley have enacted, w~e tl1e
Anti-Terrorist Act which has created SLtch a climate of terror in
both city and countryside and has jailed journalists, lawyers,
and simple peasants, depriving them of the most basic legal
rights. All this pushes Nepal further away from the possibility
of peace. I ash you to do what you can in your own place to
promote useful and positive international responses to Nepal's
problems and to our efforts for peaceful revolution. Thanl~ you
for this opportunity to speal~ to you from afar. (Padma Ratna
Tuladhar)
Arjun Guneratne: Thank you Mary. I think the floor is
now open for anyone who wishes to comment or to ask questions.
THE ISSUE OF DEMOCRACY

john Metz: I had a question for Kanak. You were suggesting that democracy is the solution to Nepal's impasse, and I'm
wondering what kind of democracy you're thinking about'
Especially given vvhat Steve Mikesell was saying about democracy. I mean that without addressing the inequities in
access to land and other resources , without dealing with the
all-pervasive corruption, it seems unlikely that peace can be
restored. One type of democracy that strikes me as a model
is found in the Indian state of Kerala. Here they have restructured opportunity to meet the needs of the poor majority.
Kanak Dixit: That is the kind of restructuring that we are
suggesting. lt is not the restructuring of the Maoists lt goes
beyond the Maoists. lt will not be easy. This is a long-term
process, not a panacea. We have to get over the immediate
roadblock of the Maoist versus the government-the Maoists
versus the army-and get back to negotiating a settlement.
The medium to long-term way ahead is to make sure that
our democracy increases, and this will not be through this
constitution alone . This constitution has to be deepened . One
way to do it is through evolution, through the social movements, the NGOs, and so on. The whole idea is there's a lack
of ownership of the government in Nepal right now, over the
last twelve years since the 1990 uprising. The Maoist movement came out of left field, yet it forced us to look at the problems, which in my view are actually much larger than what
the Maoi sts perceive. l think there is a lot of romanticism
in how the Maoists are being perceived. And if we look to
the source of this lack of ownership, it is having to do with
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ethnicity, it is having to do with class, of course, it's having to
do with region . By region l mean, "l can take the Tarai, you
can take the Far 'vVest." By ethnicity l mean the vast majority of Nepalis , who are divided into many, many miniscule
ethnic groups who do not have representation. So, what is
the way out? ls it through regional government' Certainly,
Kerala's democracy is an absolute minimum that we need to
have and we are actually working towards it. The Village Development Committees (VDCs) of the post 1990 period were
actually working towards that idea. Beyond that, should it be
regional parliaments leading to a national parliament? Would
that mean using the Development Zones that King Mahendra
created in the 1960s, a division which hitherto has had no
function at all? So, rather than having the VDCs and district
assemblies leading directly into the center, we should insert
a regional parliament because most of our ethnicities are divided in regions, and so would a regional parliament provide
the kind of representation and decision-making for ethnic
groups that the current parliament is not able to dol l used
to believe that talking about democracy is about romantic pie
in the sky. Now, l think we must make the democracy work,
and we must try and see why it doesn't work and what to do ,
rather than go through a gun-slinging revolution.
Mahendra Lawoti: I'd like to continue on the concept of
democracy. ln fact, democracy in Nepal is the topic of my
dissertation, so l can go on for a while. (Audience laughs)
As regards to the problem in Nepal, I see two problems. One
problem is the running of the current democracy; the second
is how to create a more effective democratic system. One of
the major problems of our current system is the lack of horizontal accountability. Because the executive is very powerful and because he appoints the constitutional commission
which is supposed to be supervising his activities, the system
has failed to work. A second major problem of the current
democracy is the failure of the electoral system to provide
vertical accountability, as evidenced by the various electoral
fraud s and abusive use of money and so on . If we can have a
mechanism led by independently appointed central commissions like the Election Commission, the Commission for Investigation of Abuse and Authority, and so on, our democracy
might be more able to check the executive and other powerful
agencies.
But going beyond the current system, how can we accommodate Nepal's multicultural society? Looking around the
world, we see multicultural societies that have different kinds
of democracies. In Nepal we have the Westminster and majoritarian democracy. However, other multi-cultural societies
have consensual, or consensus democracies. The difference
between these two systems is that rnajoritarian democracies
seem to address the issue of class, whereas consensus democracies address the issue of class as well as cultural diversity. So
in multicultural societies like Switzerland and Belgium, con-
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sensus democracies have worked pretty well. Let me explain
some of the difference between these two forms of democracy. In a majoritarian democracy, the party with a plurality
of votes has most of the power and gets to rule. However,
in a consensus democracy there are different kinds of power
sharing elements, for instance, paternalism[7] is one of the
most common things in the society, so that different groups
. get autonomy around their own cultural and development issues, education policies, and so on. So my understanding is
that if Nepal wants to have an inclusive democracy it would
adopt consensus forms, which would require some kind of
autonomy within a federal system, some kind of proportional
electoral system, and the protection of minority rights written
into the constitution. And even the regional government that
might form would have to protect the minorities within the
region because a lot of ethnic groups within Nepal cannot
protect themselves.
Unfortunately, in a dialog between the government, the
political parties, and the Maoists, I don't think many of these
issues will be discussed. If we look at what happened in 1990
during the dialog between the Palace and democracy movement leaders, when it came to political power, the "restoration of democracy movement" leaders got most of the power
from the king, but they accepted that the king would maintain complete control over the army. But in terms of making
cultural issues a key element of the negotiations, the democracy leaders just didn't do it. The reason for this is that the
democracy leaders, people like [Ganesh Man Singh, Krishna
Prasad Bhattarai], and so on have the same kinds of interests
as the king. And I guess on many issues, even the Maoists
might share these interests. I believe that the political parties
are slightly more progressive, because they have accepted, at
least in terms of their declarations, that they would go for
autonomy, secularity, and so on. But when it comes to the
real bargaining process, I don't know how hard they will fight
for ethnic group rights . They might give them away to get
something else on the table . So, my proposal would be that
there should be a constitutional assembly composed not only
of political parties, but also of representatives of other interest
groups in the society, like cultural interests, societal interests,
etc. Only by including all voices in drafting the constitution
can we ensure that a viable democracy will form .
WAR AND VIOLENCE AS TERRORISM

Julia Flowerday: I vvouldlike to make a general (:omment
to all. I know the conference intended to include experts on
Afghani stan as well as from Kashmir and Nepal, and I think
we could have benefited from that broader spectrum. Because
vvhat I sense is that terrorism is not just killing, it is also the
traumatizing of those who survive. So, what I want to consider is the ways war and oppression by sta:te governments
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or by ethnic groups can terrorize those they do not kill. For
example, it would have been informative to have listened to
scholars familiar with Afghanistan talking about the Taliban
and the kinds of trauma they caused to women and others
without actually killing them. Or we could consider the practices of the Israelis as they interact with Palestinians. The
Israelis practice a vVestern sort of trauma, where they'll take
their victims away from the local population to torture them.
In the developing world, however, terrorist acts often occur in
open public view. A particularly horrible example occurred
in Gujarat this last year when Hindu nationalist extremists
killed thousands of Muslims in retaliation for Muslims killing about 100 Hindu supremacists on a train. The retaliations
included women who were pregnant and had their bellies
slashed open, their fetuses killed, and then the woman herself
killed. Or Muslims who were rounded up, locked in a house ,
the house flooded with water, and electrical wires thrown
into the water, electrocuting all the people. Or children who
had kerosene poured on them and they were set afire in the
street. The people who witness these atrocities are all traumatized and terrorized. But of course, those committing these
atrocities are really interested in controlling the people who
live, not the ones who die, so our focus should also be on the
living. There's also a way humanitarians play into this game
of trauma because they reproduce those images and spread
the word, thereby also creating terror in people who are just
at the margins of whatever is going on. I don't know if any
of you saw the film Gladiator, but I thought it was absolutely
brilliant because it showed how the violence of gladiator
fights and killing Christians helped those in power control
the society. It's the kind of trauma and terrorism that I think
we're all a part of today, but we're involved in it at different
levels and in different ways. And I just think that if our panel
discussion had been a bit broader, we might have penetrated
some of these issues a little bit more. We really have a big
spectrum to consider when we look at terrorism.
U.S. INVOLVEMENT

john Metz: One of the things that strikes me about our
discussions today is the comp;exity of the issues and their
geographical specificity. Cabeiri Robinson talked brilliantly
about the complexities of Kashmir. Sara Shneiderman and
judy Pettigrew talked about specific places in Nepal and the
specific events that occurred in those places that have affected local people. Mahendra Lawoti has discussed the varying
forms of democracy and how the structure of the political
system can accommodate or ignore the needs of groups who
may well wage war when their needs are neglected. But on
the other hand, what's going on in the U.S. right now is rampant simplification, a fearful retreat into cliches and jingoism, a willful ignoring of the complexity of our world. So,
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this is what we should really be doing, trying to counter this
over-simplifying trend, trying to make our students and our
society realize the complexity of our world, because learning to accommodate the complexity and the ambiguity will
determine our survival as a civilized society. The other thing
is the hegemonic power the US wields. Those of us who are
US citizens have a responsibility for our government. It has
the· power to give money and horrific weapons to vvhomever
it decides will further its interests. Moreover, it can create the
discourses that justify actions that affect the fates of millions
of people. The US can label the Maoists terrorists and define
people in ways that make them deserving of death. So, how
can we counterbalance these trends and the powers of the
US7
Sara Shneiderman: I'd like to follow up on that. I have
many comments about the numerous strands of our discussion, but I want to speak to US involvement in particular and
then respond to Padma Ratna Tuladhar's statement that Mary
Deschene read earlier. But first I'd like to ask while we're all
here whether we want to take collective action, perhaps make
a collective statement about the situation in Nepal. I am hoping that Judith Pettigrew will describe how the Britain-Nepal
Academic Council came to make a public statement regarding
the war in Nepal. And then l want to ask whether the ANHS
would like to do something similar. Perhaps that's an issue
we should take up at the full membership meeting tomorrow
night, but I'd like to raise the issue now while everybody's
here. Judith, maybe you could fill us in on what happened
in the UK?

Judith Pettigrew: It was in February 2002. lt grew out of a
conference which was specifically about the war in Nepal that
we had in London . We wrote to the Prime Minister condemning the Nepal government's requirement that health practitioners report to the military the medical treatment of people
who have been injured in the war. 'vVhat we did was discuss
the issue on an afternoon, draft a collective statement, and
decide to write to the Prime Minister, which we did. And we
left it up to individuals to sign the collective statement. And,
we received a reply very quickly, though it was not a reply that
we were happy with, but it did show that our concerns had
registered with the Prime Minister.
Steven Mikesell: I have another suggestion. There is an
open public newswire and Internet site that goes to 40-50
countries called Open Media [www.internews.org]. so .l request that you publish thing5 about the war in Nepal, especially about the US advisors and arms, at that site. I'm. also
trying to put together a global Web page of publications. Another thing I've noticed is that many local newspapers, like
·the Madison papers, are getting information on line, as are
community radio stations across the US , including Pacifica
Radio . So, getting reports and opinion pieces to them is one
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good way to reach a really big audience.
THE GLOBAL CONTEXT

Li Onesto: I am Li Onesto with the Revolutionary Worker
newspaper [http://rwor.org/s/nepal.htm] . ln 1999 I had the
opportunity to travel in the guerilla zones of western Nepal for
3 months and to interview many of the insurgents, including
some leaders of the CPN (Maoist). l wanted to speak to some
of the issues that Mary Deschene raised, and I also wanted to
discuss the significance of the base areas, their pivotal role in
the strategic program of the Maoists. Even the government
has admitted that most districts have these base areas and
that it has lost control over them. There was a lot of talk today
about what motivates the Maoist insurgents. Many of you are
experts on Nepal. You have detailed knowledge about conditions there: the poverty, the inequality, the caste system.
People are looking for an alternative. Especially after the 1990
uprising, people expected changes, but there were none. So,
they looked for an alternative, for leadership, and that search
became part of a push in the direction of the Maoists.

At the same time, l think it's very important to understand
that there is also a pull. What is it is that is actually capturing
the imagination of the thousands of people who are joining
the Maoists? What is the relationship between that and the
base areas where they have established what they call "people's power." Because l don't think that they would be having
the kind of military success that they are without the pull of
their hope for a new Nepal. This is not just what the Maoists
are saying, but it is what the international news media report,
and what the government's own report shows.
As Mary brought out earlier, we must dig into what is going on in rural Nepal. ·w hether we agree with it or not, you
have to really dig into the Maoist program. What is it that
they're offering to people? What vision is capturing millions
and millions of peoples' imaginations? When l was there,
I interviewed a lot of people who had witnessed the transformation that is going on in the base areas, especially with
women and their participation. So, what is the actua l strategy
of the Maoists, especially in relation to the base areas? The
strategy is actually to protract the war. ln other words, they
don't want to come up against the government in a decisive
battle. Rather their strategy is to have a long drawn out war
in which they're building up base areas and seizing power bit
by bit until the point where they can actually seize complete
state power. This leads to the discussion of state power. In a
lot of countries guerilla movements have the goal of waging
armed struggle in order to negotiate a piece of the pie, in order to become part of the present set-up . That's not at all what
the Maoists seek. This is what really delineates them not only
from other communist or political movements in Nepal, but
from other movements all over the world.
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Another crucial area is the question of a larger global context. This issue that Steve is raising is tremendously important. The US role, especially since 9/ll, is ominous. That
Colin Powell is going to Nepal or that Nepal's Prime Minister
is invited to the 'White House is unprecedented. How will US
military aid and military generals visiting Nepal to investigate the civil war affect the government's desire to negotiate a
peaceful solution? I think one of the questions that we have to
ask is, what is the role of US citizens in speaking out about the
human rights issues, about the "state of emergency" and the
king's recent seizure of power, about the U.S. government's
military and diplomatic support, given to a government that
is clearly carrying out massive human rights violations? You
·need to do what the Committee to Protect journalists in New
York has done to publicize internationally the repression of
journalists that's come down, the censorship, and the jailing
of not just Maoist journalists, but even mainstream journalists. So I don't think there has been enough coming to grips
with the responsibility that you people here have in terms
of educating the public beyond these circles. I mean, this is
great here, you are sharing information with each other, but
how many people in the broader US population know about
what's going in Nepal? I mean, isn't it the responsibility of
people here who know about this stuff to speak out? I think
that's something that you really need to think about .
just a couple of other points on the question of a larger
global context. When I was interviewing villagers in the guerilla zones, they were always very curious about and wanting to know about other revolutionary movements around
the world . They also were very intent on me communicating
their message that their struggle was part of an international
struggle, that they saw their struggle as in solidarity with
other peoples' struggles beyond Nepal. Now this isn't just an
abstract gesture. If you actually look at the things that the
Maoists are doing, like their participation in international organizations, it is clear that their strategy is an international
one. A concrete example that you may not be aware of is that
the Nepalese Maoists and 10 or 12 other Maoist organizations
from the region formed an organization and held their first
conference last year. (This group is the Coordination Committee of Maoist Parties and Organizations of South Asia.)
They see this as a strategic alliance, a strategic coordination
because they know that even if they do attain their goal of
seizing povver in Nepal, that they can't stop there . They know
that when they take control of Nepal it will upset. the stability of the whole region. Because they're very clear th?t they
think that India will eventually get more directly involved
in opposing their struggle. And so, I think the regional strategic significance of the Maoist struggle is another thing to
consider. And finally we have to return to how the U.S ., UK,
and other powers are looking Nepal in terms of the volatility
of that region, and what a successful Maoist example would
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mean in that whole region.
Finally, I wanted to say a few words about an extensive
interview I had with the top leader of the CPN (Maoist), Prachanda . One of the things that he really stressed was their
international strategic view. At the very end of the interview
he told me that although Nepal is a very small country, because of their circumstances, they can be a spark which has
a great deal of significance beyond Nepal. So to conclude, I
think that, some of this international context was missing
from the discussions today. And its not just a backup, but it
really is what's driving the situation right now. We see Tony
Blair holding an international meeting of the major imperialist powers in London to discuss the Maoist problem in Nepal.
When does that happen? Since when does the President of
the United States invite the prime minister of Nepal to the
White House? It seems Nepal has become some part of the
overall global strategy of the US and its allies. So, what will
you Nepal scholars do?
Arjun: May I ask, if you are going to address yourself to
what Li is talking about?
Will Van De Berg: Yes, I will. I am Will Van de Berg. I
was also struck with the absence of an international context
today. I agree with Li that base areas are a very key element
in Maoist strategy, that if you achieve comfortable base areas,
you can enculturate all the populace, and so you can actually
prolong the conflict for generations if you like. In addition,
base areas provide safe training areas for the struggle and for
the ultimate, last stage of attack, which is taking control of the
urban areas and the entire state. And I also agree with Li that
base areas have allowed the major escalation of the conflict
that we are seeing. But, I have been amazed today that I have
not heard Sendero Luminoso mentioned even once, because
Peru is the closest parallel to what's going on with the Maoist
movement in Nepal. Sendero Luminoso was following that
same strategy, but what really stopped their movement was
that they relied too heavily on a few charismatic leaders, so
when the government captured and killed or imprisoned the
leaders, they cut the head off the rebellion. My advisor, Bob
Rhodes, was living in Peru during the Sendero civil war, so
he and I are now writing a paper comparing Peru and Nepal.
Nepal's Maoists are still held in high esteem by many in the
western world because Nepal remains relatively safe for tourists and Westerners. What is less well known is that during
the first ten years of the Sendero struggle, they also did not
attack western tourists. When finally they did start attacking tourists , the tourist industry declined drastically and that
hurt the economy and the government. Of course, Nepal's
tourist industry is already suffering. I have been doing my
dissertation research on tourism for the past three years,
and so I watched as the royal massacre and the 9/ll attacks
crushed tourism in Nepal. I mean after 9/ll agencies had 62%
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to 100% cancellation rates from Americans and 50% to 70%
from Europeans, Japanese, and other nationalities. And that's
without the Maoists attacking tourists. But, we will probably
see the lvlaoists go after tourists within the ne xt several years ,
if they follow the Sendero model. What do we all have to say
about this? I mean, most western commentators fail to condemn the insurrection because it's been safe for them, even
though it's not safe for the majority of the population of the
country. This is a seriously flawed approach. Similarly, we all
talk about our fieldwork in the areas, but when Maoists begin
to attack foreigners, vve will lose our access to these areas.

Mahendra Lawoti: I want to point out some criticism of
what Padma Ratna Tuladhar said in the statement Mary Deschene read earlier. Tuladhar's statement is clear indication
that the Maoists are willing to negotiate with the state, and
this suggests that they are willing to compromise. But, as Li
Onesto said, and she knows the issue quite well, the primary
intention of the Maoists is to capture the state. So, if the Maoists goal is to take over the state, they are not going to come
to a settlement and will have to fight it out. So, I don't know
whom to believe. Yet, I do not think that they will be able to
win. At that time the top leadership might come to a compromise, as earlier high caste communist leaders have. I am
not saying that this is certain, but I wonder if it is not a likely
scenario. The current Maoist leaders come from upper and
middle class/caste backgrounds. I wonder how well they understand the needs and experiences of the villagers who follow them. So, if victory seems to be impossible, they may cut
a deal with the government and abandon their Maoist ideals.
THE BASE AREAS

Li Onesto: I want to respond briefly to Will because while
the base areas are an important place to train an army and
carry on a struggle, the most important role of the base areas
is to actually begin to exercise people's power so that villagers
can have a vision of what the revolution can bring, the transformation of economic, political, and cultural relations within
the society. And this is really the "pull" aspect of the revolution. Take women for instance. 'vVomen, as people here know,
are very much oppressed in that society. But what are women
finding in the base areas that is capturing their imagination
and leading them. to the position where they're willing to give
their lives. I met 17 and 18 year old girls in the peoples' army
there, who were killed in action . And they knew the dangers,
they had friends who had been killed, but they were wiUing
to go into battle, knowing that they might be killed. So what
was it that led them to this commitment? In the base areas
they could actually see the beginnings--'-the beginnings, not
the full transformation-of a new society. You see it when you
meet a couple, and they say, they have a "love marriage," not
an arranged marriage. To people in Nepal, you lotow that's a
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very heavy thing. Or for people to say this is an inter-caste
marriage. Or for a 1vlaoist platoon to be traveling all clay and
then come into a village, and then the men prepare the meal,
and everybody eats together. I mean these are very radical
things that are giving people a new vision. They are addressing the class and gender issues in a concrete and real way
right now. It is not like: "Oh, we have this program and after
we seize power everything's going to be great, and you'll all
get your new society then." That doesn't really cut it, especially if you're asking people to give their lives. But if people
have concrete models in the base areas, they actually see the
transformation occurring and they're part of the process.
Someone over here raised the question of the middle class
leadership. As I interviewed the leaders, they talked about the
impact the initiation of the war had on the party in terms of
its composition. vVhat happened was a lot of the intellectuals
left. Many of them weren't ready to go underground, weren't
ready for the kind of struggle that took place after '96. So,
especially in areas where the party was not as strong as it
was in the west, intellectuals abandoned the struggle, so the
composition of the party changed to become more of a party
based on peasantry. You know, I think some of you need to
approach the Maoists with more understanding, to look at the
1vlaoist program to see what they're actually doing. I think you
will see the peasant supporters are not only reacting to the
highly repressive and impoverished conditions, but they're
also responding to what the Maoists are offering.
Sara Shneiderman: I want to say a few words in response
to motivation and the issue of the base areas . I lived primarily
in Dolakha district, though I also spent some time in adjacent
parts of Sindhupalchok between 1998 and 2000. Dolakha, in
particular, was in the process of becoming a base area, and so
I had a chance to observe some of these processes up close.
My understanding is mostly anecdotal since I wasn't trying
to do research on the civil war at the time: it just happened
while I was there. I co-authored another paper with Mark
Turin last fall in which we tried to represent some of the local
and village perspectives on the formation of the base areas
(2004. 'The path to Jan Sarkar in Dolakha district: Lmvards
an ethnography of the Maoist movement' in Himalayan 'Peo ple's War': Nepal's Maoist Rebellion'. Michael Hutt eel. London: Hurst and Co.). vVe were particularly interested in the
people's courts and the "jan sarkar," which are the people's
government that the Maoists were setting up. So, I'll just take
a few points from that paper, which reflected our perception
at the time. Now, this was actually very early, in the process
of establishing Maoist state infrastructure in the area, and
my sense is that some of the feelings of support may have
well changed afterwards when government actions raised the
stakes. A number of people with whom I was familiar helped
us understand what the people's courts in particular could offer in terms of a local way of mediating disputes, particularly
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having to do with lane!. People were very frustrated that they
had to go to Kathmandu to have any problem resolved. There
was one man that 1 came to know well who had been struggling over a land dispute for twelve yea rs and vvas about to
go to Kathmandu for his final appeal when the people's court
was set up. Sudden ly he found a quickresolution to his problem . This illustrates one of Mahendra Lawoti's points about
centrali zation: people felt that during the democracy era, the
government had greatly centra lized government processes in
the city. The feeling was that there had been greater access
to local dispute resolution mechanisms during the Panchayat
era, so the Maoists promise was for greater access to loca lized
dispute mediation. Or at least that's how it was perceived.
The second point 1 wanted to comment on is that people
were very interested in the concrete Maoist demonstrations
of land reform, or the red istribution of wealth. For examples,
some Indian missionary post was taken over by the Maoists,
and all of their cups and plates were redistributed throughout the area. People were really excited about this. They were
like: "Hey, now I've got a set of five steel plates." 1 think this
incident led people to see how redistribution might lead to
greater opportunities. So, those are a few points.
Cabeiri Robinson: 1 have several themes that keep coming into my mind, but 1 can't quite get them all to march
together. 1 really wanted to thank everybody who spoke because 1 feel like 1 learned a tremendous amount here today.
But what keeps striking me, in contrast to the comments a
lot of people have made about the uniqueness of the various
places they discussed, is the tremendous simi larities that we
see in the anti-state and inter-state armed violence around the
world, especially in the post-Cold War era. 1 think there are
continuities in Latin America, certainly in the transition from
Cold War politics to reconciliation processes. This concept
of democratization keeps coming up . 1 was thinking of Craig
Calhoun's very poignant critique of the emergence of ethnic
violence in the former Yugoslavia. Calhoun suggests that part
of the problem is the post-Cold War era, where you started to
think about democratization as something that the free market itself can produce, in contrast to the idea of civil society
being the place where democratic processes function and are
strengthened.
But then 1 also started thinking about the critiques ofNGOs
that started in the 1990s, when people started making comments like: "Well, NGOs looked like they were providing a
lot of important development work, and in fact tl1ey actually
did, but they also then lifted the responsibility of the state
to provide certain kinds of goods and services, and to protect the rights of certain categories of citizens." This has then
allowed other kinds of oppressive practices to begin and to
re-inscribe and resuscitate the NGOs·. And then, from there,
1 started thinking about current work some anthropologists
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have clone on conflicts in Africa, where they ask us to identify
the context where military organizations are actuall y providing services like arbitration, like protection, like secur ity that
we traditionally think of as being provided by the state. And
then in all of this 1 just started thinking about the invocation
of this idea of the state itself, and it seems the term is kind of
fluid and often quite slippery. 1 mean sometimes it refers to
territorial areas, sometimes to institutions, sometimes to the
interaction between electorates, political representatives, and
in stitutions. And it started to seem to me that as area specia lists, we have a very important and unique ability to actually
look at what's happening, to be a social scientist who can offer a cr itique on a lot of theoretical levels and at a variety of
spatial scales. When we take this kind of broad perspective,
we can actually see how these powerful relations are being
produced, because all of the very specific situations that we're
talking about are actually implicated in much, much broader
processes at the scale of the global economy. So, it seems like
the invocation of a broader level can provide an important
insight into what's actually happening in our areas of specialization and around the world.
VIOLENCE, TERROR AND SOCIAL CONTROL

Mahendra Lawoti : Well, l'cl love to continue the debate
on the push and pull factors of the Maoists, but 1 think there
is a third factor as well, which has not yet been discussed .
That factor is that in the villages there are certain groups of
people who do not agree with the Maoists. These people have
been subdued and terrorized into submission. Not that 1 am
not calling the Maoists terrorists, but the phenomenon of terrorizing opponents and enemies into subm ission is widely
documented by the press and others.
1 also want to talk about the long-term program of the Maoists. 1 think until last year the intellectuals in Kathmandu
were sympathetic to the Maoist movement. But that has
slightly changed, since the Maoists began destroying infrastructure, and 1 think that the Himal media opinion polls
that were clone in 1999, 2001, and this year support this view.
ln 2001, the popular opinion survey did not identify Maoist problem as one of the top three problems of Nepa l. But,
the recent opinion survey, as it was reported in the Nepal
press, indicated that the majority of the people now think
that Nepal's democracy is threatened by the Maoists. So, going to the long-term program of the Maoists: what do they
really stand for7 Suppose there are people in the vill ages who
disagree with the Maoists, as in do they have the right to live
over there or not? The Maoists say they are talking about the
People's Democracy. So what is People's Democracy7 ls it that
people can listen, but can they voice opposing opinions? Or
is the people's democracy going to be the programs which are
decided by the leaders of a certain political party7 So 1 think
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we have to ask the difficult questions while talking about the
Maoist rebellion.
Arjun Guneratne: I'd like to draw some parallels between
the Maoists in Nepal and another Maoist movement in South
Asia that no one has yet mentioned, the People's Liberation
Front, or JVP, in Sri Lanka. The JVP started off as a Maoi st
movement in its first incarnation in 1971 when they began
a civil war, but the rebellion was quickly suppressed by the
government. And then the second uprising came in 1987, but
by then this was very much a Sinhalese nationalist movement,
although it used marxist rhetoric. India had intervened in the
government's war with the Tamil separatists, so the rebellion
was very much anti-Indian and anti-Tamil. After about two or
three years of some very brutal fighting, which left 30,000 to
60,000 people dead, depending on who's counting, the JVP
was crushed for the second time. Most of the casualties vvere
killed either by government death squads or by the JVP, with
the government death squads killing most.
There are many, many parallels between the JVP and the
Maoists, but the one that came to my mind has to do with
the nature of their violence. Now, when you have to deal with
your class enemy, or a traitor, or someone who's passing information to the police, the expedient way is to kill that person.
But what happened with the JVP and with the government
death squads was that they were not content with simply killing their enemies. Rather, they would mutilate the bodies of
their victims. So, when government death squads went into a
village and took people away in the middle of the night, the
victim's bodies would turn up the next morning on the public
road. They would have been put on tires and burnt. That was
a popular way for the government death squads to deal with
people, even those who were not even necessarily JVP, but
were suspected of being JVP or had been fingered by their
enemies in the village as being JVP sympathizers.
What the JVP did was similar. I'll give you an example.
At the University of Peradeniya in Sri Lanka , there is a nice
round fountain in the middle of the campus about as large as
the front of this room. The JVP on one occasion kidnapped
a group of its enemies, beheaded all the victims, and neatly
arranged the heads around the fountain at night for the campus to see the next morning. Now, I've been struck by the
similar kinds of brutalities being practiced by the Nepalese
Maoists, and I suspect by Nepali state forces. Example include stories of somebody being dismembered, chopped up
into three parts or of someone 'Nho has all his limbs chopped
off but is left to survive. And when I think of these horrors, I
ask mysel f, "What is the purpose of this kind of violence? " I
mean, if what you want to do is to get riel -of your enemy, just
!(ill him , and then it's done. I heard somebody give an answer
to this question at a conference on violence in Sri Lanka that
I attended several years ago. This terrorism is not directed
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at the dead person , but at the living. They are doing this to
discipline the living, to warn any potential opponents to stay
out of any active opposition to them.
But, the conclusion I draw from this is that any movement
that needs to use these kinds of atrocities probably doesn't
enj oy widespread support. If you are a mass movement , the
overwhelming support of the people is with you, and you
don't need to use terrorizing violence to reach your goals. I
mean there might be people in the village who pass information on to the police, but they can be dealt with in the usual
way by execution. But mutilating their bodies is not necessary
unless there is a substantial number of people who aren't with
you and who therefore must be disciplined. At least that is
what makes sense to me, though I don't have any data to support that interpretation.
And returning to the JVP, once the second uprising was
crushed , the JVP eventually was legalized and has since become the third-largest political force in Sri Lanka's democratic
politics, after the two top political parties, the United National Party and the Sri Lanka Freedom Party. Moreover, the
JVP has completely eclipsed the old, traditional Marxist and
Communist left. But what's interesting about the JVP is their
support base is roughly between 7 and 10 percent of the total
vote. Their support tends to be concentrated in certain parts
of the country and not in other parts. So the JVP, for example,
is very, very weak in the cities; it tends to have a stronger base
in certain rural areas. Now, let's assume that 20 percent of the
Sri Lankan population supported the JVP, which is probably
excessive, but just for the sake of the argument we'll assume
20 percent. Well , that's very far from being a majority; that's
very far from being mass support . So these numbers provide
an insight into this whole discussion. What I think this suggests is the simple fact that an organization which is militarily
strong does not necessarily enjoy mass support. lf I can make
just one more parallel , it's with the LTTE, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam. Now, the LTTE and its supporters claim
that they speak for the Tamils and enjoy mass support from
the Tamil population. Of course, if we look at the history of
the LTTE, you find out that they speak for the Tamils because
they murdered all of the Tamil leadership and eliminated all
of the other guerrilla groups. So, it's got to the point that Tamils who do not agree with the LTTE keep their mouth shut
because they know the consequences of publicly disagreeing
with the LTTE. Therefore, the LTTE is the sole voice of the
Tamil people, there are no other voices. So, my contribution is
that we have to look at the total situation, at the history to see
what these groups have done. Is there anyone else?
ON METHODOLOGIES

judy Pettigrew: Yeah, I've got a comment. It strikes me that
a lot of us here are anthropologists and a lot of us work or have
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worked in rural communities in Nepal. And we haven't talked
very much about methodology today at all. And l wanted to
raise the point because it strikes me that this is a time when
we need to be very creative about methodology. Vve need to be
adapting methodologies. There are concerns for informants.
There are also concerns for ourselves. Are there new and different ways we should be working? Or is it the same ways
we've always worked, but perhaps with creative modifications
adapted to the violent situations we are observing?
julie Flowerday: A political geographer whose name is escaping me suggested several years ago that the newest ways to
check theory is through methodology. And so I think we need
to cut across every boundary we can and to start using every
methodology and, in effect, combining quantitative, qualitative ways of looking at things. And giving credibility to and
empowering the people of the very areas vve work in.
Lauren Leve: I just wanted to follow up on the methodology themes. It's not methodology that worries me . It's confidentiality. It's the safety of people that we work with, people
that we care about so much. And I can't stress the need for
confidentiality enough. We can come back home, and it's relatively safe back home anywhere you live. I know that especially during the Vietnam 'vVar era, anthropologists had their
work and their files used in ways that they never anticipated.
These are issues of professional and personal integrity that we
all need to think about.
Li Onesto: I'm not an anthropologist, but I can say something about methodology. First, in terms of methodology, I do
think it's important that we take seriously the information we
are given and what our informants believe and present as fact.
And I don't pretend to know all that's going on in the areas I
am visiting. And even if you're there, you're only in one area
and you don't know what's going on throughout the country.
But especially since the state of emergency, it's been increasingly difficult to really know what's going on around Nepal
because of the suppression of information. I mean, basically,
under the state of emergency, the government just came right
out and said: People are going to report to us the information
we say they must. The main issue for the government is to
get the people to tell them what is going on. And when they
didn't, the army interrogated and put in jail a lot of them . And
some of them are still in jail.

Another aspect of information is government propaganda.
There's definitely this information campaign to present the
battle with the people's army positively, in a way that implies
that the army will triumph. I mean, because you hear a lot of
stories about how these areas of war and conflict are now supporting the government, and how so many Maoists were killed
by government troops. So on the one hand you have that, but
then on the other hand, the Maoists will release information.
They've released three or four information bulletins in the last
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couple of months in which they counter a lot of what the government is putting out. I'm not saying that you have to believe
one .or the other, but I'm saying you have to really investigate
and try to weigh the different versions of what is going on
before popping off on the government or mainstream media
claims. I remember the very first People's Army person that I
met when I first arrived in Nepal was killed in battle a week
after l met him. The first report that I heard about the battle
was in the Kathmandu Post, and it reported that there had
been this encounter and that the guerrillas had fought and
refused to surrender. But, when I talked to the Maoists, they
told a whole different story about what had happened. Then
there are the stories that get told and retold until become almost legendary, even if they are not true. One is about the
actual military encounters and the revolutionary violence of
the Maoists. First of all, any revolution has incidents that are
mistakes where a local commander departs from the actual
policy of the leading force. So there's that. But there is also
the question of how the Maoists are waging their military war
against the government? From what I understand they are
not going out and indiscriminately killing all the civilians
in an area, like the government is. So, even when there are
incidents of unjust killings or targeting people that are really
innocent or imposing a punishment that doesn't fit the crime,
those errors are limited to certain targeted individuals. What
the Maoists are mainly doing, as I understand it, is attacking
the government, raiding police stations, engaging the army.
Then on the suggestion that several of you have made that
people are being coerced and don't support the Maoists but
go along with them because they're afraid. There is the argument that just because you are militarily strong doesn't mean
that you have the support of the people. On the other hand, I
don't think the Maoists could be waging the successful, continuously growing and expanding revolutionary movement if
they didn't have mass support. There is also the question of
democracy. The Maoists do not claim to stand for everybody.
They accept theories of class struggle. They don't pretend to
support property rights of landlords. Their program is to get
rid of the inequality, to establish a socialist government that's
based on proletarian power, and this is what their program
has done in the base areas. There is always going to be a certain amount of coercion by those in power. Somebody had
mentioned earlier that in the revolutionary schools they make
the kids sing revolutionary songs. Well, if we go to schools in
the US, they make kids say the pledge of allegiance. Is that coercion? Well, you can make an argument either way, that here
in the US we have a democracy, or not. But, coercion can't be
the main way that you rule, otherwise you're going to lose
support. Support has to come from showing the benefits your
program brings. My last point has to do with Arjun's suggestion that the Maoists don't have support and this is proven
by the stories of them torturing people. I think that was your
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implication there.
Arjun: No, I was saying that the situation is much more
complex than a simple statement like "they have mass support" would warrant.
Li Onesto: Okay.

Arjun Guneratne: And you have to lookLi Onesto: All right, all right, all right.
Arjun Guneratne: -at a complex situation in a complex
way.
Li Onesto: Right. I agree with that. But the key element of
this is that in terms of the actual torture and killing-peopleas-examples in order to terrorize the living. By and large it's
the government doing the majority of these incidents. 'vVhere
are the human rights violations really being carried out7

Arjun Guneratne: Okay, I think in the interests of time,
we need to wrap up the discussion. So let's have Kanak, Sara,
and Cabeiri as our last commentators.
Kanak Dixit: l will make three quick points. One is that
one shouldn't wish revolution . Number two is that in Nepal
much more than in other parts of colonized South Asia it's
very important to speak the language. 'vVithout access to Nepali discourse via the language, much of the information you
need is out of reach. You're presuming to make decisions in
your mind regarding the Maoist party without following the
debates in Nepali language, so you're missing a lot of the most
important information. And my third point is that the Maoists by and large operate outside the law, and do not consider
themselves bound by the law. So, I have nothing to say about
that. What I'd like to say is that the government has to keep
itself to a higher standard. And I say higher standards because
the Maoists, in my mind, carry on deception. But we have
to have some level of confidence in the government, in the
army. I personally believe that the Maoist control of their base
areas has less to do with Maoist strength than with the lack
of government presence. Take Operation Romeo: when the
government is out there in force, and has an army covering
the entire landscape, but they remain scattered very thin and
battling a very vicious and motivated enemy. There remains
one point that has not been discussed enough today, although
people have talked about a lot of different subjects. I think
that it's the most powerful because it tells you that the pain
lies among the common people. The pain is not in the government. The pain is not in the Maoists. The pain is in the pe_ople
of Nepal, who are who are sometimes under the Maoist gun
and are occasionally under the army gun. There's enormous
mass cumulative ecological stress and displacement of the
·people, which shows itself in many ways, from stress of those
who stay at home, to the mental anguish of the family as their
young depart from the home , to the pain of not being able to

ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION/Maoist Rebellion in Nepal

till one's land. The fact is that you're looking towards famine
in winter and late spring in large parts of West Nepal. This is
the massive pain that I think is not being acknowledged and
which is where we should be beginning to look for answers
by checking out that pain and discovering where it is coming
from. A last point: just because the armies are out, our civil
societies are practically silent in condemning the suppression
of our rights. Our media is not doing the kind of covering
that is needed. It just very quickly went undercover by saying,
"Oh the rules will not allovv us to do a lot of coverage, so we
cannot." Rather than trying to expand on the coverage, which
you could still do a lot of despite the restrictions. So the point
I'm making is that not enough demands have been made by
Nepali civil society on the Nepali media, the Nepali intelligentsia, or the Nepali government because civil society can at
least demand responsibility from the government, which the
government is not now showing. There is no political control,
no civilian control in Nepal and this is the result of the terrible tragedies we are seeing in Nepal, events which will be
reported in years to come. I think that is something at the
very least , because the government is not committed to high
standards.
Sara Shneiderman: I just wanted to make a few final points
to bring together some of the strands that have come out
about methodology. Being at this meeting has shown me that
within the Western academic community there is both a great
deal more discussion and a markedly more mature examination of these issues than there was, say a year ago. l think
that's a very good thing, but I'm wondering where do we go
from here7 I think Cabeiri's point about the need for comparative studies is clearly something we need to do . It seems
that the community of scholars working in Nepal were caught
off guard by the quick rise of the Maoist movement. People
didn't know how to address it. It's taken some time to catch
up with that, and I think that we're just starting to do that
now. One of the things that we can do is learn from the areas
of the world where there have been discourses on violence
and revolution for a much longer time: Latin America , Africa,
and other parts of South Asia. l think we need to draw those
kinds of theoretical frameworks into our discussions of the
Maoist movement. And we're starting to do that . And I think
that Kanak said something today about social historians uncovering what's happened sometime in the future. I think he's
right because part of what's going on now cannot actually
be documented. But I'm also wondering what can be documented and what our role is as those who do the documenting. What do we feel are the priorities and how do we engage
with them and how do we make those strategic choices to do
that kind of work? Or do we? And since this is going to be the
end of the discussion, I'll leave it as an open question, but I
would ask that we continue to discuss these issues in one way
or another.
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Arjun: Cabeiri, you have the last word.
Cabieri Robinson: I was just thinking about what it is like
for you people who already are Nepal experts and suddenly
have to deal vvith this tremendously violent, dangerous situation. vVhen I went to do my fieldwork in Kashmir, I had the
benefit of knowing the situation. [here there is a long, but
inaudible sentence] And I also have experience with being in
two kinds of state situations, one being a situation of openarmed conflict and the other being one of state surveillance.
[inaudible sentence] And one of the things that I found in the
literature on conflicts vvas the idea that there were certain
things that the social scientist could not know, should not
try to talk about. And I went to the field thinking that I could
not ask about certain topics because they were too dangerous.
But, one of the things that I realized during the years that I
was working in Kashmir was that this rule was actually unsatisfactory because a lot of the places around which secrecy
was produced, were actually what was creating spaces for the

practices of violence and oppression. And so we're met with
the paradox of, on the one hand, not being able to talk about
what that secret is without putting people in danger. And on
the other hand, by not talking about it , we participate in the
reproduction of these conditions by which the violence is perpetrating itself. And so it seems to me that one of the problems
that we've then come to in this is the tension between the idea
that is it our job to expose and the idea that the act of exposing, when there is no process ensuring that the perpetrators
'Will be held accountable, actually helps the perpetrators produce ongoing practices of violence. And it seems to me that
while obviously we can't talk about the kinds of secrets that
put anyone in imminent danger, it is irresponsible not to talk
about the structures of power which produce those secrecies
and then give [?]. I think there's actually not a huge amount
of social science and anthropological work on this, but there
is some . And a lot of it actually goes back, you have to go back
to a very interesting . . [tape runs out]
Arjun: Well thanks to all of you for this interesting and lively
discussion and for your participation throughout the day.
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Roundtable and Panel topics to ANHS President Arjun Guneratne,
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all appreciate the opportunity to meet other Himalayanists and to
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